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I. State Insurance Fund Admits that Express Notice On The Issue Of Causation Was Not 
Given. 
State Insurance Fund admits that causation was not an expressed issue at hearing. 
(Respondent Brief, p. 12). Its attempt to boot strap it as an issue by arguing that the issue was 
"reasonable and necessary medical care ... and the extent thereof' simply does not wash. It wrote: 
"The only review the Commission is entitled to make is whether treatment was reasonable." It then 
cited to Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 770 P.2d 395 (1989) and argued 
against reasonableness. (Respondent I.C. Hearing Brief, p. 6). 
The Commission totally ignored this stipulation of counsel and opted instead to address 
causation. A stipulation is a "voluntary agreement between opposing counsel concerning disposition 
of some relevant point so as to obviate need for proof or to narrow range oflitigable issues." Blacks 
Law Dictionary 5th Ed., sv "Stipulation." State Insurance Fund cites no authority that a stipUlation 
of the parties can be ignored by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission cannot 
ignore a Stipulation or insert an issue not expressly agreed to be tried by the parties. Hernandez v. 
Philips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P .3d 111 (2005). 
State Insurance Fund also cites to the recent case Fifo v. Home Depot, Inc., 2011 Opinion No. 
92 (September 2,2011), for the proposition that it aligns with Henderson v. McCain Foods, 142, 
Idaho 559, 130 P.2d 1097 (2006), in that causation must be proved before medical reasonableness 
can be established. It is true Henderson and Fife are alike, but not for the proposition for which it 
states, but rather for the proposition that an issue of causation must first be "noticed up" by the 
Industrial Commission and then argued by the parties. Like Henderson, Claimant Fifo made a 
request for a hearing on the issue of causation and reasonable medical care. The evidence included 
testimony of "the physician who performed the independent medical exam" who concluded that 
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claimant's need for surgery was not related to the industrial accident and "claimant's surgeon" who 
opined that the industrial accident was related to his need for surgery because it exacerbated his 
condition (Fife, p. 2). After addressing causation, the Commission concluded that "Claimant had 
failed to prove that the medical condition for which he had surgery was causally related to the 
industrial accident or that the accident aggravated his pre-existing degenerative condition." (Id., 
Emphasis added). 
In contrast, to Fifo, Gomez did not submit proof relating to causation because it was not 
raised by or agreed to as an issue by the Industrial Commission or the parties. 
II. State Insurance Fund's Argument Rewrites Idaho Code § 72-432. 
Idaho Code § 72-432 is clear and unambiguous: "the employer shall provide for the injured 
employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendants or treatment, nurse and hospital 
service, medicine crutches and apparatus as may be reasonably required by the employee's 
physician or needed immediately after an injury ... and for a reasonable time thereafter." There 
is no causation language attached to Idaho Code § 72-432. Without going through proper legislature 
repeal or amendment, State Insurance Fund would have the statute read "that the employer shall 
never be required to provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other 
attendants or treatment ... until and unless Claimant proves a causal relationship for each and every 
treatment." With this tortured interpretation an unbearable burden is placed on Claimant. For 
example, a Claimant who is prescribed daily physical therapy would be required to submit proof 
of cause after each and every treatment in order to justify more treatment. Would State Insurance 
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Fund really expect "causation" paperwork to be submitted daily to substantiate treatment? This is 
impractical. This is not the intent ofIdaho Code § 72-432. 
III. Claimant Did Not Ar~ue Causation in its Brief. 
Contrary to State Insurance Fund's argument, Gomez never addressed causation in her Brief. 
There was no need. State Insurance Fund paid for additional treatment to Gomez's treating 
physician, Dr. Jake Poulter on July 22,2010, long after the February 2010 opinion of Dr. David 
Simon. (Gomez Ex. 7). This alone is evidence that causation was not an issue in mind. It is true, 
Gomez's medical records were admitted into evidence, but not referenced for the issue of proving 
cause, but of reasonableness in accord with Sprague. 
Had Gomez known that causation was an issue to be determined by the Commission it would 
have presented her case much differently. Rather than permitting medical records to speak for 
themselves, which is sufficient to prove reasonableness of treatment, Gomez would have taken the 
deposition of Dr. Poulter or Dr. Huneycutt or a radiologist to explain "cause". "Cause" in this case 
would focus on the MRI, the "objective" evidence. Without narrative, it reveals a "tear in the 
annulus fibrosis" and "disc protrusion." (Defendants Exhibit C, p. 5). Any credible physician must 
admit that an MRI is an instant snap shot in time. The fact that one physician, whether it be a 
radiologist or otherwise, does not see a disc impingement on the MRI does not mean Claimant has 
no impingement or symptoms. The dynamic nature of the body, whether it is positional or 
gravitational, may immediately create a condition in which the disc is impinged and then relieved. 
Moreover, physicians may disagree on what each may "see" on an MRI. Thus, the "objective" 
evidence of the MRI, though important, is not conclusive and clinical correlation is always indicated 
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in such settings. Because there was no intervening or independent accident or occurrence which took 
place between treatment dates, causing new symptoms, it stands to reason, Gomez's work accident 
continued to cause symptoms. Even though he acknowledged this, State Insurance Fund's expert 
Dr. Simon, declared that her symptoms were not related to the work injury. Yet in the same breath, 
he did not assign a "cause" leaving it "unable to be determined." (Defendants' Exhibit A, p. 5). 
This type of testimony calls for intense cross examination which must be bolstered by Gomez's 
expert opinions to establish cause. This opportunity was not afford to Gomez. 
IV. Public Policy Considerations. 
Legislative intent as to the value ofIdaho's workers is expressly set forth in Idaho Code § 
72-201 : 
The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against 
employers for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted 
in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modem industrial 
conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries 
and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of 
Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, 
declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private 
controversy, and sure and certain relieffor injured workmen and 
their families and dependents is hereby provided ... (emphasis 
added). 
The exclusiveness of an employee's remedy incomp law is fixed, subject only to third party 
claims as referenced in Idaho Code § 72-223. To assure that the legislature means business, it added 
a stiff penalty for employers who fail to insure liability. (See Idaho Code § 72-210). 
The liberality of the statutes in favor of the injured workman has been reiterated by this court, 
but none more succinctly stated as in Steinebach: 
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Among the primary duty of an employer to an injured workmen is to furnish 
him reasonable medical, surgical or other treatment necessary to rehabilitate 
him and as far as possible, restore his health, usefulness and earning capacity 
... one of the principal requirements of the workman compensation law is 
that insofar as possible, the injured workman shall be restored to health by 
reasonable and proper treatment ... and workers compensation law shall be 
liberally construed in favor of the injured workman. Steinebach v. HojJ 
Lumbar, Co., 98 Idaho 428, 431, 432,566 P.2d 377 (1977). 
Defendants argument, if accepted at face value, cuts the heart out of work comp law, which 
is timely and reasonable treatment be provided to injured workers. Currently, the practice of 
treatment follows the scheme as outlined by Idaho Code § 72-432 and is premised upon 
reasonableness. Appropriately this may be called the "causation presumption." For example, 
though an emergency room report does not specify or note a causal link between an injured employee 
suffering from a penetrating wound, a broken bone, or an acute or debilitating back or neck injury 
caused by a blow or fall, causation is presumed. The Surety then pays the bills on the basis of 
reasonableness. Thereafter, it continues to pay for subsequent treatment such as follow up care, 
medication, x-rays, physical therapy, etc., under that same presumption. This is the practical, 
understandable and real world approach to payment made for medical care as outlined in Idaho Code 
§ 72-432. 
Only in the event that a Surety chooses to challenge reasonableness of care by establishing 
an expert opinion contrary to it or to challenge causation in order to terminate benefits must one or 
both of these issues be addressed. This way issues of causation and/or reasonableness remain 
distinct and separate or by agreement may be addressed together. 
If Defendants' argument is accepted, then the Surety may refuse to pay medical treatment 
because a Claimant had not established, in every treatment scenario a statement eluding to or 
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providing a causal link between the treatment and the injury. Worse yet, a Surety could issue denials 
"en masse" and make them retroactive and/or call for reimbursement of payments made to medical 
providers because "cause" has not been established. What would stop this travesty? 
The current trend in the industry is that a Surety will use an IME physician who practices 
in the same geographic area to render opinions on treatment, cause, stability, impairment, etc. For 
example, in Southeast Idaho, Dr. Simon and Dr. Knoebel get the call; in Ada County it appears to 
be Dr. Richard Wilson. When an IME exam is contrary to the treating physician's opinion (almost 
always), and a denial of treatment is issued, a Claimant must then seek private insurer payment (if 
such is available) or rush to quality for state or federal assistance in order to pay for treatment. In 
a denied case, a Claimant still remains injured and unemployed and without immediate recourse, and 
usually a hearing takes months from the denial date. This is bad enough. But if a Claimant does not 
get a fair hearing, it is tragic. So much for sure and certain relief! 
Claimant and defense bar, the Industrial Commission, and this Court must wrestle with this 
very real issue with real consequences and decide which path to take: deny Claimant hearing access 
or permit it on stated issues. Fortunately, the path is clear. The Legislature paved the way in Idaho 
Code § 72-708. The hearing process and procedure should be "summary and simple." "Rules of 
equity" require that Claimant be provided notice and the opportunity to present evidence on 
causation. 
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V. Conclusion. 
Gomez requests that this Court follow constitutional and statutory law and to expressly 
declare that the issue of causation must be specifically and expressly "noticed up" in accord with 
Idaho Code § 72-713. 
Gomez requests that this Court uphold Idaho Code § 72-432 which requires or infers that 
once the employer has commenced payment for Claimant's medical care, a "presumptive chain of 
causation" is established and this chain cannot be broken absent a physician opinion to the contrary. 
Gomez requests this Court clarify its ruling in Henderson and Fifo, holding that the issue of 
causation or reasonableness - - or both is permitted and that causation is not required to be addressed 
in every instance before the issue of reasonableness is addressed. 
Accordingly, Claimant requests the Commission to reverse and remand so that additional 
evidence can be presented on the issue of causation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ...E.....i"'-- day of October, 2011. 
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McBRIDE & ROBERTS, ATTORNEYS 
cBride 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on this a day of October, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the person(s) listed below either by mailing, 
overnight delivery, hand delivery or facsimile: 
Paull. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LA W OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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~Mail 
o Overnight Delivery 
o Hand Delivery 
o Facsimile 
McBRIDE & ROBERTS, ATTORNEYS 
BY: __ ~~4-~~~ ______________ ___ 
Michael . McBride 
